

What role did you mostly perform in the response? WERG, DW site assessments

What location did you mostly report to? USCG center, Houston

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 10 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC region 7, Kansas city, KS

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

I thought our immediate supervisors on the water team were good, gave good direction and listened to feedback. Working with TCEQ on the water side worked well, they knew the systems and area better than we did. The USCG was very gracious in opening their facility to us, and once we were located in nearby hotels it was a great location. Demobilization was very smooth. There were no safety concerns for me personally. Having an EPA issued smart phone made my life easier because I could easily retrieve email and used the device for navigation. Others were issued flip phones and ended up using personal devices for navigation.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

- We were late getting some instructions on our approach that would have been helpful up front. We received an "SOP" very late in the deployment. Perhaps those that came Tuesday were better informed than those of us that came Wednesday.
- The hotel stay in Katy, TX was horrible due to the drive time; I was very grateful when we
 were moved closer to USCG base.
- The work with TCEQ on temporary debris sites was not coordinated well and was uncomfortable. The EPA role there was undefined and vague.
- Still not sure about OT waiver the amount of OT allowed and required exceeded the maximum pay ceiling, and I'm not sure if that will ever get paid to me.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
	I think some frustration with the reports we were turning in would have been avoided with more up front direction.
	Increased cost due to fuel cost and time to travel
	Delays in mission accomplishment, increase cost in using EPA personnel in roles they
	weren't trained or prepared for
	Probably no affect on R6
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?
-	Better up front communication with team.
•	Closer accommodations up front
	An EPA supervisor would have helped – we were left with no one in charge and TCEQ
	almost acted like they were inconvenienced by our participation
-	Up front communication



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

What location did you mostly report to?

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
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There is good comradery and teamwork.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

The trailers are not designed for two adults. I was the second person in the trailer. I tried the bottom bunk but it was hot with no air vent. I tried the sofa but it was short and not good either. I tried the upper bunk but the cushion intended to be a mattress was harder than the lower bunk. Additionally, the upper bunk had nothing to hold onto when climbing down the stairs and was a safety hazard. Climbing up was okay but down was dangerous. Additionally, exiting the trailers was troublesome as well as the handhold was not helpful when exiting the trailer. I landed wrong and hurt my foot. It was a mild injury but further shows the safety limitations of trailers. After three nights of very little sleep my roommate offered to switch with me giving me the queen bed. The Coastquard had hotel rooms and I suggest we utilize hotel rooms so responders can get real

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects) The effect is creating responders that are not rested and thus many safety issues can result. Lack of sleep is known to be very hazardous. c) What should be done to fix this problem? As soon as hotels are available allow responders to choose to stay in a hotel.	rest. If trailers must be utilized with double occupancy, then trailers with two queen beds need to be procured.
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What role did you mostly perform in the response? WWTP assessments

What location did you mostly report to? Houston

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC from R6

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
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- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

- Mark McCasland was a great leader
- Staff assigned worked well together.
- Maps with locations for each day
- Correct addresses and contact information
- · Contractor to enter data at end of day
- Hotel in close proximity of IC
- Having a set return time by 4pm

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

- Lack of address, gate coordinates, or good contacts, no map (this was the case for too many of the sites)
- Looking for non-existent sites because they had not yet been built
- Sites not sorted for types of sites to assess. Staff "assessed" several oil/water separators (such as at a car wash). Or inability to sort?
- Seemed that state staff assigned to IC were not truly under the IC hierarchy but still had
 to answer to immediate supervisors rather than focus on the response for a designated
 period of time.
- Not knowing what proper gear to bring. Staff did not know they would be going to chemical facilities for WWTP and needing fire retardants.

- Few people, if any, remembered hotel tax exemption forms. We were told we can't submit our vouchers with the tax on it. We have to work retroactively with the hotels to get a reimbursement (hopefully).
- Reassessing sites that were already assessed and given an OK
- "Door to door" PR afterward instead of during.
- Not having and/or understanding time reporting until the very end during the deployment right when we had to submit it.
- First hotel assigned was too far away and traffic issues after a long day and being tired is unsafe.
- · Vehicle break-in and stolen gear
- b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
- Increases time spent driving (the most dangerous part of job).
- Increases time in general, which also increases costs
- Increasing either of the above increases the costs and delays accomplishment
- Can/does make EPA look bad in the public eye and PR door to door afterward does not help but only makes it worse.
- May frustrate staff (state and EPA) enough there may be less volunteers later.
- Possible safety issues depending on situation

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

- Better preparation/communication:
 - o Whoever makes the arrangements with hotels for the deployed staff can easily send tax forms in advance to the hotels and emailed to staff when they send info
 - o Knowing what to expect for types of facilities (ex. if it's DW and WW will they need fire retardants for chemical sites or is it just community sites that will get assessed?)
 - o Make it clear that staff (EPA OR State) are under IC hierarchy once assigned, not their direct supervisors.
 - o Hotel arrangements should be as close to IC as possible
 - o Public information handouts for field staff to give out to public and the entities they assess
 - o Get the time entry information asap
 - o Some of this can be started before a hurricane even hits, or as it hits. When you know there will be a response, start the process (such as getting the time entry data information, list of volunteers, public info handouts).
- Field work:
 - o Personal cell phones were best way to communicate in the field. But, we don't want them FOIAble, so perhaps issued cell phones.
 - "smart" Cell phones are great for looking up addresses. but when we didn't have the information we needed it was a hindrance to use them for web searches for contacts, using ECHO, can't get onto our secure sites. Maybe an iPad with wifi capabilities would help. But, if the data given to field staff was up to date and put together properly, we shouldn't to do that kind of searching in the field or call the office daily

- to get more information. The lists given to field staff should be complete and up to date.
- o Ensuring the office staff who put together the data for the field staff know what they are doing, and ensuring the data base is up to date with all information needed to do the work effectively. Even good staff are only as good as the database they are working from.



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

I worked on the drinking water team. Our job was to ensure that the public drinking water wells were fully functional. For those that had Boil Water Notices, we worked with the operators to ensure that samples were properly taken and sent to the lab to ensure that the drinking water was safe. Once we completed the water project, I worked on the landfills team.

What location did you mostly report to? I was located in Houston (Bravo Branch).

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? I was involved in the response from September 5, 2017 to September 16, 2017.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC. Region 7, Lenexa, Kansas

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1) What worked well?

The system that was in place worked well. The plans given to us by the supervisors were very helpful. Working with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality was a great idea. The line of command and tactics was clear and concise. Meaning that, we knew just who to contact for specific information. The level of response was very organized.

2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
While working with TCEQ, I noticed that some of the water team members were young and not as experienced in drinking water wells. Also, the use of updated navigation systems would have been helpful.
 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
I think that the mission could have been accomplished faster and more efficiently if those with limited knowledge and experience of drinking water wells were paired with those of stronger backgrounds. The use of updated navigation systems for each team would make completing projects more efficient. We spent a lot of time in traffic. The use of an updated navigation could have reduced the amount of time spent in traffic.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Provide navigation systems to the teams that are going out in the field.



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Debris observer for TCEQ inspectors

What location did you mostly report to? EPA staff at Texas ICS, EPA Alpha branch in Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? Four days including travel. Tasking indicates that there may be follow-up visits at a later time.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC from Region 06

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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1) What worked well?

The level of response was appropriate based on the TCEQ schedule.

Documentation of activities was compact and well done.

Health and Safety orientation was completed in a timely manner upon arrival

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Poor definition of the specific tasks that were to be accomplished by the debris inspectors. Clear line for reporting outside of the Alpha branch was not clarified until after inspectors were in field

Poor coordination with TCEQ on the scope of the inspector tasks.

Mobilization and planning for mobilization was poor. Apparently the decision to send observers was made on 9/13 and inspectors were verbally informed, however mobilization instructions were not received until the afternoon of 9/15, and draft TA was not issue until after general working hours on 9/15, for a deployment on 9/17. I was told around noon on the 15 that I was not on the deployment list only to be told 15 minutes later that I was indeed on a deployment list that the REOC staff member did not see until he rechecked with others.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs
	delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Frustration of inspectors regarding when and where to mobilize to or if they were going to mobilize, as well as extended efforts and time to prepare and get TA approved. Lack of definition of tasks to be conducted resulted in confusion on the part of inspectors.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Better coordination between the EPA managers requesting the resources and the staff providing the effort to define the specific tasks and reporting requirements.

An improved system in Logistics to track requests for staffing and assignment of staff to fill the requests.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Back up to the Personnel Resource Log (Asset Tracker).

What location did you mostly report to? REOC.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? September 13, 2017.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? non-RSC. Which Regional office/location? Region 6.

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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1) What worked well?
All of the personnel in the REOC worked very well together. I was very impressed with their knowledge.
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
Since I only worked one day in the REOC, I did not see any area of concern.

	b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
NA		
	c)	What should be done to fix this problem?
		NA

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What role did you mostly perform in the response?

TAGA Mobile Laboratory Lead – air monitoring adjacent to the refineries in Texas.

What location did you mostly report to?

Houston

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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1) What worked well?

Region 6 Houston lab and its staff were great resources for the mobilization. They were able to provide power, security, delivery address for gases, etc. for the TAGA laboratories. OSC Enders was with the TAGA and provided a means to collect information when unavailable through the ICS.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

COMMUNICATION. There was very limited and not very timely dissemination of critical information.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Lack of coordination with the TAGA mobile laboratories' efforts.
a) What should be done to five this problem?
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
COMMUNICATE more effectively.

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What role did you mostly perform in the response? I performed assessments at drinking water treatment plants in Bravo section, in and around Houston.

What location did you mostly report to? I reported to Ellingon Field Coast Guard building.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 12 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Response Support Corp from Region 7.

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

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1) What worked well?

The mobilization from Region 7 was not well-coordinated. Departures were not communicated well. Once I got there, the command could not have been more well-organized. The leadership of Mark McCasland, Robert Houston, and Meaghan Brasnahan was incredible. All of our calls from the field were answered promptly and we never felt out-of-touch from command. The documentation in the form of the assessment sheets were well-organized and provided a simple checklist that was easy for the assessors to follow, even if they weren't experienced drinking water staff. The level of response was perfect and the assessors worked at the peak of their skills and time available to get the job completed as soon as possible.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

map the driving directions to the PWS. Every assessor and partner used their personal smart phones and data plans. This should be considered the next time there is a disaster, so that smart phones, tablets, or some other form of connection is provided and the assessors don't have to use their personal devices.
 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
None. No one hesitated to use their personal smart phones or data plans to complete the
mission.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Assign PWS assessors smart phones, tablets, or some other form of internet data connection to
use in place of personal smart phones and data plans.

One area of concern was that we had to use our personal smart phones almost constantly to complete the assessments. They were used 3 ways: 1) to locate the GPS of the assigned PWS through the TCEQ SDWIS-State 2) to call the operator or administrator to discuss the PWS 3) to

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What role did you mostly perform in the response? Provided technical assistance in the R6-Dallas Environmental Unit, then provided ERT oversight on the TAGA 2 mobile laboratory.

What location did you mostly report to? Two weeks in the R6-Dallas EU, then one week on the TAGA 2 mobile laboratory in the Houston area.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? To date, approximately 3 weeks.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? I am a member of the Environmental Response Team, based in Erlanger, Kentucky (Cincinnati, Ohio).

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1)	What worked well?
All	worked well; the level of response that I observed was appropriate.
2)	What is an area of concern?
	a) Communication was effective throughout the command; communication to the field
	personnel could be improved.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs,
delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
I did not see any negative effects.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Awareness of the need to communicate up the chain.
Awareness of the field to communicate up the chain.



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Public Information Assistance Team (PIAT) Web and IT.

What location did you mostly report to?

Office of External Affairs Conference Room.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

August 29 - September 21, 2017 (Three weeks)

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

Non-RSC

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1) What worked well?

Although we did not follow the structure and deployment plan as laid out in the PIAT Concept of Operations, what we did worked extremely well. The most important thing we did right was to have each position two deep. This not only allowed for backups, it also added the synergy of two experienced people. The chemistry and competence of the team was fantastic and they accomplished every challenge quickly and professionally.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

It seems like the only way to get information to the public in the early days of a disaster is with flyers distributed by outreach teams. Getting up-to-date material printed and into the hands of the people who need to distribute it is a constant problem. Also, there are restrictions on the amount of material that can be printed due to rules that make scene under normal operations, but are major barriers when people's lives' are at stake. There were also delays getting approval for out-of-date material that had to be updated and approved.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs
	delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

This problem causes delays in getting much needed information to disaster victims. In a worst case scenario victims don't get information at all.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

In a disaster, we need a mobile printing plant with either GPO personnel who can print what we need as we need it, or a waiver from unrealistic rules that make no scene during a disaster. The mobile printing plant needs a generator that can power printing equipment even if there is no power, which seems to be the norm in most disasters. If we can't arrange a mobile printing plant, then there needs to be one in place in the mobile command post with all printing waivers in place. There also needs to be a requirement for annual review of all disaster-related material that might be needed during a disaster or emergency. Keeping material up-to-date should be part of ongoing training for PIAT members.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? <u>Assistant Safety Officer at Bravo Branch from September 10 -18, 2017 and then IMT Safety at CC from September 19 -22 (demob).</u>

What location did you mostly report to? Houston and then Corpus Christi.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? Twelve days.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? R6-IMT (Safety); N-IMAT (BUR-3 Safety). Which Regional office/location? Region 6 – Dallas, TX

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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1) What worked well?

The IAPs and HASPs were good. Mobilization paperwork was good, but the hotel location for the Houston branch could have been closer to the Branch CP, but I understand that.

I thought we have learned from previous disasters/exercises how to pre-plan and get people out the door. Good work in the REOC, IMT and the branches.

2) What is an area of concern? a) Short description of the problem
None other it would have been better to have a hotel closer to the Bravo CP, but I understand the
logistics "nightmare" occurring.
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 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
None
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
None



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Regional IMT- Planning Section- Situation Unit Leader

What location did you mostly report to?

Region 6 REOC/ Corpus Christi, Texas Incident Command Post

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

3 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

Regional IMT/ RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

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1) What worked well?

The overall process worked well. I was able to respond as a slightly different position and was able to learn how to be a SITL to better my overall IMT skills.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

There were no areas of concern.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
N/A
c) What should be done to fix this problem? N/A



What role did you mostly perform in the response? PIO

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi, and then City of Houston EOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 13 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? IMT member. Region 6.

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1) What worked well?

There were many experienced people who worked on this, and their ability to adapt and be flexible was impressive.

The N-IMAT PIO was a valuable resource.

The R6 PIO Assistance Team worked really well—very helpful in the early days of deployment. IC Martin's calm demeanor and respect for the IMT was great.

Everyone in the IMT I was deployed with worked well together and supported each other. This was my first deployment, and the more experienced people offered tips and advice that were very helpful.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

- Since we were Federal employees working in an official capacity, I think some thought should be given to whether it's appropriate to wear politically-oriented hats and t-shirts (Make America Great Again)—as well as religious t-shirts.
- Things didn't always go smoothly, but I think that's just the nature of a big response with lots of moving parts. I think it's important to just be flexible.

	b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
	c) What should be done to fix this problem?
-	Provide guidance to people about what not to wear while on deployment with respect to
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What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? "Charlie" Port Arthur/Beaumont

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 9/8-9/23

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Community Engagement Specialist/Community Involvement Coordinator. Region 7, Lenexa, KS

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Having someone in place that was familiar with the area and community members was a huge plus. Having a MiFi hotspot was priceless. Having a background in working with communities was an added plus. Reaching out to communities that are often over looked, attributed to a background in Environmental Justice.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Having Community Liaisons that are not familiar with working with the public speaking to community members.

Allowing Community Liaisons take the lead in roles they were not required or asked to do. For example, adding a 4pm conference call when an 8am conference call had already been established. Keep in mind there were some groups that were commuting for hours at a time to and from their assigned locations each day. If you allow an hour in the morning and an hour in the afternoon in addition to commute time, how much time would be left to assist communities. Hearing groups report that there was no more work to be done in a particular location. Maybe a checklist should have been provided to ensure that every rock had been overturned of key stakeholders to reach out to in each community.

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
The inability to be the most effective in a timely manner.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Engage Community Involvement staff outside the window of a natural disaster and inquire what
the best utilization of staff and resources would be in the event of a natural disaster. Also, involve
staff that has participated in past disaster for input. Compile all comments and provide a briefing packet to those deployed in the future. Look to R7 as an example of how to best equip staff
before, during, after deployment.
Borore, daring, arter deproyment.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Branch Director

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? OSC R7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
Pre-planning with State and USCG. Pre-selection of possible command post sites.
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
iPads without GPS capability – cost of not having it was huge and caused days of work to correct work that had already been done.

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Major increase in cost and extending length of time to complete mission
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Enable gps on current iPads and don't ever buy more without gps capability

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov

What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Environmental Unit Member

What location did you mostly report to?

R6 REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Level of Response – Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases cost delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects) 	S,
c) What should be done to fix this problem?	



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC - R7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Plans -

Command/Control – I thought the command structure was very organized.

Process – The support with time sheets and travel from R7 was very good. Everyone was super helpful.

Level of Response – I think the short day-end reports were appropriate for each team.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Plans – For the type of work performed, it was not necessary to require H&S equipment such as boots and hard hats be brought, especially since there was no chance of expanding the mission to encompass other types of work that would require it.

Command/Control - No concerns

Process – I wish there had been better coordination between EPA, FEMA, State, and Local entities to allow community liaisons to provide a broad packet of information that would include local and state information on debris management, volunteer protection (H&S), and other documents that we found were available on-line and at some distribution points. I think this would have saved a

lot of federal, state, and local resources since we were on the ground and distributing information, and would have made us more effective and helpful to those affected by the disaster.

I also wish there would have been more flexibility being able to develop or at least find and distribute additional guidance we found necessary throughout the process. A more flexible and responsive approval system would have made us much more effective.

We did not have enough handouts to distribute and since there was no flexibility to allow us to make copies locally, we were forced to request e-mail information from people to send them information later. A lot of affected people got very upset at that point since they had no home, were living in tents in some cases, and had no access to the internet and no way to charge their phones on a regular basis. They felt that we were completely out of touch with their situations and I felt like I was pouring salt in their open wounds.

Level of Response – I think the level of response was ok, but the community liaisons should have been on the ground within a couple of days of the disaster. We ran into a lot of people who said they would have loved to have the information to distribute within the first week, and that on week 5 information about preventing mold was too late.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Plans – Bringing unnecessary equipment increases costs of extra baggage on the plane.

Command/Control - No issues

Process – Being able to copy documents locally would save on shipping charges from copying in Dallas and shipping large boxes of copied documents to Corpus Christi by Fed Ex (2 weeks after they were initially requested).

Level of Response – Bringing in people earlier would allow for a more efficient response because it would allow for a quick assessment of what information is needed and allow for better coordination with the state and local agencies on what to distribute and to whom to distribute.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Plans – Don't require unnecessary equipment be brought on airplanes.

Command/Control – Enable local command to make copies and to be flexible in finding and distributing additional information to meet local needs and to meet evolving situations.

Process – Allow local copying of documents, enable local managers to approve additional information for distribution.

Level of Response – Get people on the ground and working with local and state officials earlier to ensure that EPA can maximize our effectiveness and all resources by distributing a packet of information that represents the entire response rather than a tiny sliver (just EPA's portion).



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

My role was Community Liaison to all my teams assigned counties.

What location did you mostly report to?

I was in "Charlie" group located in the Beaumont/Port Arthur area and reported this same place.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

I was involved in this response for a little over two weeks (September 21-October 6, 2017).

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

I'm a non-RSC. EPA Region 7 in Lenexa, Kansas Water Wetlands and Pesticides Division /Water Infrastructure Management Branch

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?	
The team assignments worked very well.	
2) What is an area of concern?	
a) Short description of the problem	

None that come to mind.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
N/A
c) What should be done to fix this problem? N/A

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

What location did you mostly report to?

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
Several times being directed to attend meetings or calls and person giving the direction having no
idea of call-in numbers, rooms, time, or who to ask to obtain the information.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
	 Causes staff to miss meetings and calls because necessary information is not passed along. Causes people to spend valuable time tracking down the person with the information.
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?
	Do not direct staff to attend a meeting or call without providing call-in number or room, date, and time.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What location did you mostly report to? REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 16 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC/N-IMAT – Region 7, Lenexa KS

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Overall --- this was the most organized well executed response I have been involved with, everyone was a team player. For the most part the size of the response was appropriate. Everyone "stayed in their lanes" which was the reason for the good organization. As a LSC I really liked having the "resource person" under Logs – it really improved communication and efficiency. I believe that Regions 6 and 7 work well together and hope that R6 feels the same way.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Mobilization/De-mobilization - The Mob document was too wordy and should be made clear and to the point with only that information that responders need. The overhead de-mob process should be included the mob document so individuals know up front what will be expected of them. I think a mob/de-mob template could be developed that could easily and quickly completed --- if specific information is required for specific groups that can be provided through an addendum document.

Response Check-in may have been an issue. I tracked the 213RR orders – I order people but was not given official notification that they had arrived – I closed orders assuming that the order had been filled.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
The effect was on the responders confused as to what they need to know and have with them
when reporting de-mob issues – I was concerned that we were collecting all pertinent
documents.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Develop a mob/demob template
Establish a process for incident check-in
Keep in mind that I maybe over the top on documenting things

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to?

Bravo

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

14 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

RPM – Remedial Project Manager (RCRA)

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
The Olympidians flexibility and adoptation to the about a few with a state of the s
The CL's resilience, tievinility, and adaptation to the challendes of executing our roles with rather
The CL's resilience, flexibility, and adaptation to the challenges of executing our roles with rather
limited resources and very little structure.
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
·
CL's not being in/on the Incident Command Structure

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Printing costs increases in order to provide useful outreach.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
CL's roles should be clearly included in the command structure prior to deployment.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Drinking Water Inspections

What location did you mostly report to? Houston, Texas

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 13 Days (September 4-16, 2017)

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC – Region 7 (Lenexa, KS)

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Health and safety, line of command, roles/responsibilities, documentation, and de-mobilization worked well. The level of response appeared to be appropriate.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

The EPA's roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined during the coordination of the TCEQ landfill inspections. The assigned work was successfully accomplished.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

None.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Effectively define the EPA's roles and responsibilities during TCEQ inspections.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov
Please return completed form to R6Harvey_Hotwash@epa.gov or to the box in the REOC. In addition, if you would like to give verbal feedback you may call Matt Loesel at 202-578-2125 or Steve Mason at 214-665-2276.



What role did you mostly perform in the response? The TCEQ Location off 35 and Palmer in Austin, Texas was the site from which calls were made to Drinking water and Wastewater treatment facilities. The treatment facilities status was updated into response manager. Green represented okay, yellow represented partially operating (usually on a generator), red represented not operating, and gray represented destroyed. The black dot usually represented no answer after called it would be unknown. But after called we really should have been selecting the choice, OUT, instead of unknown. Out meant a call was made and there was a message left. Unknown really should have been for a call with no message. This was later realized but since everyone had been entering unknown after leaving a message that is what we were told to continue to do. Some of the facilities that we called were not never built and some were built but they were not online. I would recommend a selection be added to the last question in response manger to be **not built** and another selecting being **not in** use, meaning that it was not being used at the time on the incident. Also, in preparing beforehand something TCEQ could do every year is make a call sheet in advance in case the will need it in the future. But when they make this call sheet to have all the facilities managed by the same owner filtered, SO THAT they don't receive multiple calls. Wastewater eventually started filtering in this way so that the contact that had 10, 30 or even 50 facilities could be emailed the questions, I WILL ATTACH THIS BLANK EXCEL QUESTIONAIRE. Having the complete list of contacts ahead of time would help and drinking water facilities along with wastewater facilities were handled by the same contact at times but these facilities were being called separately. Calling drinking water and wastewater separately is not the most efficient way to get information (when the drinking and clean have the same contact many times). The drinking and clean water facilities should be combined and filtered by contacts so that they are grouped by who is in charge and that contact must only be contacted once for all their system, either by email or by phone. Also, this large list in a time during an incident should be divided up from the beginning into sections of 500 and given to those that are calling systems. No one else EPA or TCEQ should have any of the same systems or contacts to call, this will avoid calling people multiple times and save time and repeat work. If the list is divided properly from the beginning everyone will be assigned the same number of systems to call and after they have contacted their 200 or 300 assigned to them they are done with their job. Assigning a certain number to each person means everyone will be calling the same (or emailing) amount of systems and once they have heard back from all their systems their job is complete and they can leave.

What location did you mostly report to? TCEQ Headquarters in Austin Texas off 35 and Palmer.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? August 27 (28 official) to September 8, 2017.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Region 6 and I am not an OSC. I am a State Revolving Fund Project Officer for Drinking and Clean.

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

The treatment facilities status was updated into response manager. Green represented okay, yellow represented partially operating (usually on a generator), red represented not operating, and gray represented destroyed.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

The black dot usually represented no answer after called it would be unknown. But after called we really should have been selecting the choice, OUT, instead of unknown. Out meant a call was made and there was a message left. Unknown really should have been for a call with no message. This was later realized but since everyone had been entering unknown after leaving a message that is what we were told to continue to do. Some of the facilities that we called were not never built and some were built but they were not online. I would recommend a selection be added to the last question in response manger to be **not built** and another selecting being **not in use**, meaning that it was not being used at the time on the incident. Also, in preparing beforehand something TCEQ could do every year is make a call sheet in advance in case the will need it in the future. But when they make this call sheet to have all the facilities managed by the same owner filtered, SO THAT they don't receive multiple calls. Wastewater eventually started filtering in this way so that the contact that had 10, 30 or even 50 facilities could be emailed the questions, I WILL ATTACH THIS BLANK EXCEL QUESTIONAIRE. Having the complete list of contacts ahead of time would help and drinking water facilities along with wastewater facilities were handled by the same contact at times but these facilities were being called separately. Calling drinking water and wastewater separately is not the most efficient way to get information (when the drinking and clean have the same contact many times). The drinking and clean water facilities should be combined and filtered by contacts so that they are grouped by who is in charge and that contact must only be contacted once for all their system, either by email or by phone. Also, this large list in a time during an incident should be divided up from the beginning into sections of 500 and given to those that are calling systems. No one else EPA or TCEQ should have any of the same systems or contacts to call, this will avoid calling people multiple times and save time and repeat work. If the list is divided properly from the beginning everyone will be assigned the same number of systems to call and after they have contacted their 200 or 300 assigned to them they are done with their job. Assigning a certain number to each person means everyone will be calling the same (or emailing) amount of systems and once they have heard back from all their systems their job is complete and they can leave.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Having a properly filtered list that include waste and drinking would be ideal with contacts divided up when they have multiple systems. Coordinating with the TCEQ Regional Offices such as REGION 12 is a must because they did not begin calling the first couple days but they later did and they at many times called the same systems that were already in response manger as green. If they were green it meant they did not need to be contacted they were okay. In response manger and while looking at the forms Region 12 filled out many times the Regional TCEQ office called the same system with two different people when EPA had already marked them as green before they called which means that system eventually received calls from three different people asking the same questions. That is not efficient. It would save money and time if the list was properly divided and coordinated between all of TCEQ headquarters in Austin, EPA and the TCEQ Regional Offices.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Having the complete list of contacts ahead of time would help and drinking water facilities along with wastewater facilities were handled by the same contact at times but these facilities were being called separately. Calling drinking water and wastewater separately is not the most efficient way to get information (when the drinking and clean have the same contact many times). The drinking and clean water facilities should be combined and filtered by contacts so that they are grouped by who is in charge and that contact must only be contacted once for all their system, either by email or by phone. Also, this large list in a time during an incident should be divided up from the beginning into sections of 500 and given to those that are calling systems. No one else EPA or TCEQ should have any of the same systems or contacts to call, this will avoid calling people multiple times and save time and repeat work. If the list is divided properly from the beginning everyone will be assigned the same number of systems to call and after they have contacted their 200 or 300 assigned to them they are done with their job. Assigning a certain number to each person means everyone will be calling the same (or emailing) amount of systems and once they have heard back from all their systems their job is complete and they can leave.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Public Information Assistance Team

What location did you mostly report to?

Region 6 PIO based in the Dallas REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 3 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC, R6

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

This was the first incident for the PIAT to be activated. The organizational structure of the PIAT seemed to work well, and the community liaisons were well received and useful ambassadors for EPA information.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Our team was primarily assigned to provide support to the PIO in areas of research, media, communications and public information/education materials. We found that we spent a tremendous amount of time tracking public information materials on topics such as mold, what to do after a flood disaster, water disinfection, etc. We primarily focused on EPA materials but found that we had to default to other agency's materials in topics that we didn't cover. We had to determine what info was relevant, and found some good materials had specific references to Katrina, Ike and Rita rendering the material useless for this response. The useful materials we did find then had to go through FEMA to be approved for distribution. After approval, we found we could not print anything here in the region for distribution to field ops because of some GPO rules regarding printing and procurement. The process took several days from research to approval, to finally printing in headquarters for mailing to the field locations. Meanwhile people were desperately needing information on how to safely begin the cleanup process. Additionally, the need for materials in Spanish and Vietnamese became apparent. The process was even more cumbersome because the request for Vietnamese materials had to go through HQ. The materials they had available on-line were not quality controlled and our R6 Vietnamese expert found the existing translations were very poor and incorrect. Further, the existing Vietnamese information was on higher technical stuff (e.g. ASPECT plane, air monitoring tech info), that was not relevant to the general Vietnamese public affected in incidents like this. It took a lot of time and effort to get this information corrected, resulting in more delays and more confusion as to who was doing what (HQ, their contractor, and our local Vietnamese expert).

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

This increased cost in staff time spent tracking and waiting, which significantly delayed getting information out to the public by days, when we could have had that information out in one or two days tops.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

- 1) We can anticipate the need for public information in these types of disasters will always require handouts for mold, air and water quality, drinking water, etc. regardless of where the location of the incident occurs. Materials should be general enough, not incident or location specific. All of that material should be developed, pre-approved by FEMA and placed in an EPA public information response kit. We had plenty of time between Katrina and Sandy to anticipate that these materials would be needed for the next event yet when the time came, we had to start almost from scratch.
- 2) Materials should also be translated and quality controlled in advance. Although HQ has a contractor for translations, it appears that little to no quality control is in place to ensure the translations are correct. Our regional Vietnamese expert even found an instance were an approved and published handout on our web site still had an English sentence in the middle of a paragraph.

- 3) In an incident response, we shouldn't be constrained by printing and procurement rules. An agreement (MOU, waiver, etc) with GPO should be worked out in advanced, exempting FEMA responses from printing procurement rules, and authorizing response agencies such as EPA to print materials locally rather than going through the cumbersome process and delaying materials for days.
- 4) If an MOU or waiver can be worked out, consider deploying a printer to the field that can handle on-demand copy jobs rather than waiting on HQ or other offices to mail copies.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? EPA Laboratory

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 12 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC, toxicologist, EPA Region 3

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

My team, Maren Taylor (R7), Trevor Urban (R7) and Gloria Vaughn (R6). We were assigned Liberty County and the team worked well together since we were all open-minded, flexible, respectful towards one another. Once we were assigned our mission (disseminate fact sheets to the locals within the community) we didn't complain about the task and successfully accomplished or goal. I truly believe the work we did increased the publics knowledge about EPA in a positive way which was reflected in the meeting with industries, I participated in, as well as the community. Everyone I saw and greeted complimented and even gave me a hug once they learned I worked for EPA. These were really proud moments.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

It was unclear why the Incident Command Structure (ICS) was not being followed in respect to the Community Liaison's (CLs)? Why was there no Public Information Officer(PIO)? And why was the Community Liaison Coordinator (Janetta Coats)) not housed at the same location as the CLs? The failure to follow the ICS structure and not having the Community Liaison Coordinator housed at the same location as the CLs created many authority, direction and power struggle issues for the CLs. Therefore, there were many (in particular Valmicheal Leos (R6), Joann Rogers (R5), Michelle Kerr (R5) and Carol Ropski (R5) who took full advantage of the lack of an on-site leader and assumed the leadership role and/or provided constant negative, rude and unprofessional comments about the Community Liaison's Coordinators ability and knowledge to perform her task. Although Joann Rogers (R5) did provide an excellent suggestion and coordination of the

team by organizing and maintaining a daily conference call, her verbal slander and lack of authority towards the Community Liaison's Coordinator (Janetta Coats) should not go unnoticed. Working as a team, she and Valmicheal Leos did everything they could to facilitate an environment where they "acted" as if they were being helpful to the Community Liaison Coordinator while instead providing clear an obvious negative remarks, body gestures and actions that showed they had no respect for the authority. Some like Michelle Kerr (R5) and Carol Ropski (R5) jumped on this team and together forged a campaign to paint a picture that they are the "best of the best" at EPA with clearly more leadership, skills and ability then the person who was placed in charge (Janetta Coats). Witnessing the unprofessionalism of Valmicheal Leos toward Janetta Coats as well as how he often spoke to the CL's was difficult. And hearing Carol Ropski at the end of a daily call shut out "This is Bull!" after the call (suggesting Janetta's daily call was pointless) was rude and extremely unprofessional. Perhaps some of this mockery could have been avoided if the proper ICS structure was used and if the Community Liaison was housed at the same location as the CLs.

In addition, arriving 10 days after the actual hurricane and realizing the Fact Sheets (our primary tool for communication) were still waiting for approval, was extremely disappointing and definitely slowed down completing our task. Then when the Fact sheets were finally approved, we were told we could not print at the EPA Lab. Some ignored this request and printed anyway, while other followed the guidance that was given. This created disparity among the CLs because some now how fact sheets to do the task while others did not. Then the ban was lifted that we could print at the EPA Lab while simultaneously (day 5) we were finally asked to place orders on the number of fact sheets we would need. Not everyone order the fact sheets they needed and thus when they finally arrived, CL's who didn't order any fact sheets started taking the Fact Sheets from those who ordered. Since the Fact Sheets were our primary tool in performing our task, it would seem these Fact Sheets would have taken priority and we wouldn't have to fight one another to get them to perform our job.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Deploying people with power and/or authority issues is a n concern at any emergency incident. They create an environment that is filled with negative energy. The deployment and task are stressful enough (being away from your daily routine) and then adding in negative people who want to act like they are being helpful while they question everyone's ability to perform their assigned task is mentally taxing and decreases productivity.

The delays with all the fact sheet issues definitely causes unnecessary arguments and fights as well as delays in performing the task.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

- 1.) Follow the ICS. We were trained that it works and it does!
- 2.) Share with the regions about problematic employees who cannot follow authority and leadership. They need to be counseled instead of not addressed and then sent to another deployment to repeat the same behaviors.
- 3.) Better organization from the top down. If there is disorganization at the top. It funnels down to the bottom.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to?

EPA Region 6 Lab

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

12 working days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

IMT and RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

The overall goal and mission of the Community Liaison Initiative was met and the activities were very successful. My team met with several local government officials, business owners, community leaders, non-governmental organizations, and staff at FEMA disaster recovery centers who were very appreciative of our presence and the information we provided them. Getting EPA liaisons out in the affected communities, communicating with clients, local officials, and community based organizations, and providing information pertinent to impacted homeowners/shareholders was in and of itself an important aspect of EPA's Harvey response.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

There appeared to be a disconnect between the work of the Community Liaisons and Unified Command (ICS) structure. In addition, for the first 9 days, there was a lack of overall leadership and guidance at the CL reporting locations (Alpha, Bravo and Charlie), which led to EPA staff proactively stepping into leadership/management roles to fill the vacuum.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
This caused conflict and confusion about the chain of command, unity of command, and other span of control issues.
c) What should be done to fix this problem? Ensure ICS is followed for every aspect of an emergency response.
Elisure 103 is followed for every aspect of all efficiency response.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Field PIO

What location did you mostly report to? Unified Command

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 12 Days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? R6 non-RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

IAP (Planning section was great throughout my deployment), Health and Safety (Great job to David Eppler), Command/Control (Great job to John Martin, Nick, and Gary Moore), Process (logistics, docs, finance), level of response (good job staffing up as needed, shuffling individual Ops teams to meet needs, and demobing when tasks were completed).

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

From a PIO perspective:

- 1) Working in Unified Command with three branches, two not co-located with Unified Command. Assistant PIO's in other branches would be recommended in the future for a large response. We met that need and staffed accordingly, but just more of a lessons learned.
- 2) Having Unified Command, three branches, as well as the EPA REOC and EPA EOC, brought unique challenges. I had a grasp of my responsibilities of who to share what with within EPA but found it difficult getting explaining and getting "buy-in" from other agencies within the Unified Command who expected to see more of a strict "within" Unified Command review-release process for distribution of communications materials, statements and responses.
- 3) I noticed a need for the IMAT to cover a newer function within the IC, which is that of the USCG photographers. They were a great resource, but when I arrived they were listed as PIOs throughout the branches, which I found to cause a lot of confusion and took days to clarify their roles and duties to folks within the structure.
- b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
- 1. (Referring to 1 above) A possible need to balance staffing cost with an APIO as an on-site link for the field PIO and REOC to help prevent delays in information needs for various internal and external purposes.
- 2. (Referring to 2 above) Although this response was unique in a lot of ways, it may be useful to think about how we approach explaining information flow to supporting agencies in "EPA led" responses in the future.

3.	(Referring to 3 above) This would just involve adding possible new roles in the IMH and/or considering more detail in the Field PIO functions and where photographers, etc land in the Org Chart for large responses.
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?
	I've touched on my general suggestions in the above examples.



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC R6

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Team concept. Allowing CL to make decision in the field as to where to go next and who to contact.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

agencies were providing water well testing, how to contact them and what the cost was. We never were provided with this information. I learned after the response that the information was available on EPA's Harvey website. I did look there while deployed but was unable to find the information.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs,
delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Prevented accomplishment of mission. Residents were concerned about their water. We
provided incomplete information.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Have a team or person in Dallas to research questions asked by residents.
Trave a team of person in Dalias to research questions asked by residents.

The CL group asked our representatives in Dallas on several occasions for a list of which county

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Orphan Container Search and Recovery Water OPS .

What location did you mostly report to? USCG Houston

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 21 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? FOSC; Which Regional office/location? R2

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?	
Pretty much everything	
What is an area of concern? a) Short description of the problem	
The I-Pads where not always accurate for LAT-LONG;	
I don't like R6 lodging policy was moved from a hotel that was closer and cheaper; the parkin and restaurant was cheaper than the one I was told I had to stay in it was a nice enough hot but, had to fight more Houston traffic to get where I needed to go,	_

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Slowed down finding and retrieving orphan containers;
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Not sure anything could be done

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Water Infrastructure Division/Group Supervisor of 3 Group Supervisors (I wish I knew what to really call this)

What location did you mostly report to? Bravo Branch (USCG H-G Sector)

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 3+ weeks (week 1 was phone ops, 2 weeks at USCG)

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Region 6 RSC/IMT

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Years of planning/training under NDOW paid off. Integrating with the TCEQ Houston office DW & WW staff was seamless. Working under Zehner (Branch Director) and Rhotenberry (Deputy) was easy. **EPA Region 7 staff were excellent additions**.

Contractor support in entering all DW and WW site assessments at end of the day.

My three group supervisors were outstanding (none had the requisite ICS position-specific training but no one could tell)

Our field teams were extremely capable as well as patient when having to make sudden (and often) changes.

Texas State Guard was a great asset to our teams.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Water desk in the REOC needed to be setup immediately (took many days or so it seemed). We need training for several staff where it is not only our section chief doing the majority of the tasks.

Need training for DW/WW staff who could be called upon to staff an ESF desk in a state EOC as an infrastructure liaison(?). One of our staff was pulled to do this while still in Austin (night shift).

Need for pre-scripted 213RR for infrastructure

Need more DW/WW staff trained as group supervisors. The ones I recruited on the fly got OJT and were excellent in handling their teams though.

DW and WW teams not always completing assessment forms completely – made data entry into RM difficult at times for our contractors.

Getting management reports out of Response Manager

Getting a daily SitRep and IAP – never got an IAP. The IAP would have been helpful to fill out contact info on daily 204s. SitRep would have been nice very early on to see what was/was not being reported and how.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

There could be delays in mission accomplishments (for example lack of group sups and REOC water desk staffing)

Pre-scripted 213RR gets Region mgmt "buy-in" on what our actual needs are likely to be prior to an event. As for staffing, it was like a shotgun went off at the beginning and it was raining field staff before we could assess our actual needs.

I expanded my org structure overnight to three groups which wreaked havoc on our initial field teams. Eight folks showed up unannounced at 4 o'clock one afternoon, and we had to scramble to find them work for the next day as well as rearrange our existing teams.

Staff deployed to my group did not come with "qualifications", expected duties, etc. There was one staff that highlighted this issue which we can discuss later (lack of PPE, etc)

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

I will be very busy this off-season. For starters, I have an EPA source (HQ office of Water) for a 4-day training on ICS 300/400 to hopefully be conducted in April.

We will be conducting Response Manager training for field staff using some of the assessment forms and photos from this response.

We now have the ERD from RM which has tables and relationships, etc. so we can have our queries already built before any next event. Plus we have a great dataset from this response on which to develop the queries.

All "supervisory" positions in the ICS org chart (especially Ops) should automatically get a daily SitRep and IAP when issued (at least the ones who would be submitted daily 214s to the Ops chief)

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

I was at the OC80 Staging Area under Unit Leader, Bill Rhotenberry. This hazardous waste collection area was located at 2200 Dorsett Dr., Houston, TX

What location did you mostly report to?

I reported to the OC80 Staging Area at 2200 Dorsett Dr.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

I worked for 2 weeks, 14 days on site plus two travel days, one on each end of the deployment.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

I am an engineer working for HQ under OLEM/OEM/CBRN CMAD

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

I was assigned to oversee the contractor at the OS80 Staging Area which is the collection pad for hazardous waste.

The contractor stood up the pad during my first few days and started receiving containers, and segregated those containers appropriately.

I reported progress and issues to the Unit Leader via text messages and the 214s which were completed each day. This communication worked well!

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

b) It would have been nice to have an office trailer to work out of. A trailer did arrive the last way I was on site, 9-19-2017.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs,
delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
If the haz cat kit would have been there sooner the bulking of chemicals could have taken place
sooner and the waste streams could have moved faster.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
If we had more EPA or contractor personnel who were haz cat trained and had more haz cat kits,
that may have sped things up.

a) It would have been nice to have the hazardous categorization kit earlier to help segregate

I had no real concerns other than follows.

waste streams and to start the bulking process earlier.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison-Delivering informational resources to EOC, DRC, other city officials, and FEMA sites

What location did you mostly report to? Liberty County

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 15-days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? No, Region 7, 11201 Renner Blvd. Lenexa, KS

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Delivering the informational resources electronically to the official who could distribute them to the community.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

There was a significant amount of driving. It would have been helpful to be housed closer to our county.
 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
This contributed to increased costs and shortens the work day or ability to achieve more accomplishments.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
House responders closer to the county.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? JFO

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC, Region 6

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

The handoff from the previous person for the position assigned. There was adequate overlap time.

Getting account codes into people plus seem to go smoothly. Althoughsee below

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Getting information on deployment. Was told verbally a certain day was my travel day but did not get email with information until my travel day.

Related to the above deployment. Was told and email on deployment indicated there were procedures for getting a TA, OT request submitted and approved and pay cap waiver.

Account codes given one code early on for time worked at the JFO under a Field Operations Support MA. However, when the codes were updated with the end of the 100% FEMA, there was no longer a separate code for FOS MA charging which is 0% state share.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Makes it hard to plan for your deployment.

Makes it hard to plan for deployment, when you are waiting to the last moment to determine if you have an approved TA to travel on.

If my time and travel are charged to the wrong account codes will impact the total subject to state cost share after 9/21.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Should give at least 24 to 48-hour notice to give staff time to pack and travel to the site.

Decide up front who is doing TAs and stick with it. Written procedures for getting a TA, OT request and pay cap waiver were not followed. Even after 2 weeks no OT request or pay cap waiver was ever received.

Check with the Hurricane up front and make sure they don't impact the Region during the end of year and when the Region decides to do an upgrade to people plus.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Liaison SEOC/JFO Austin

What location did you mostly report to? SEOC/JFO Austin

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 19 Days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? R6 Dallas

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

What worked well?

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

2)	Wh	nat is an area of concern?
	a)	Short description of the problem
	1)	Having to work 24/7 at the SEOC. Working 24 out of 29 hours was uncool.
	2)	Getting timely responses back from the REOC when FEMA has a short deadline on a request.
	3)	Dealing with a request to "sample all private water wells" and be told <i>ad nauseam</i> what a bad idea it was by all parties.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov

Emails

1) I did not deploy. I was ready to, but Region 6 cancelled my deployment along with many others from region 8 who were ready to go. That may be a good input for hotwash on getting organized on who you need or don't need. Don't put in WebEOC that you need them and then cancel. I moved several appointments to be ready to deploy. Thanks

1) Coming on board to the response in Mid-October, I was most frustrated with how the communication and back and forth was handled. I understand things change frequently, however, but it was frustrating to pack a week in advance only to be on hold, and then asked to deploy and have to get everything put together on a Friday. At one point my regular supervisor asked if I could leave that night...so I was given the impression that deployment was imminent. I know that certain aspects are going to be in a continuous changing process, so I will definitely get over this. One item that I believe could be fixed fairly easily is the H&S Clearance. A few people I know (including myself) had their deployment almost delayed due to H&S Clearance issue well into the response. For me it was my fit test (required for my H&S but not for this response). My suggestion would be to work with the H&S Office earlier in the response to have the RSC Members and others that have volunteered to be cleared by H&S for potential future deployment. While I understand this may create more work for the H&S Office, it would also allow additional time for individuals to be cleared for deployment rather than getting fit tested in Addison at 3:00 pm on a Friday so they can fly out on Sunday (like what happened to me). It was also frustrating to be given changing directions at different points during the response. Several emails for PP+, conflicting instructions on who was making TAs, and accounting codes for flights, things were changing more frequently than what it seemed like it should. For some of these things, it would seem like FAQs could be developed that would be standard for all Emergency Responses. A standard Demob Form. What to do if your dates change and how to handle Travel Management Price changes for airlines when they change dates. Things of that nature. Who to contact for different situations, etc. Lastly, we should never upgrade our accounting system in the middle of a response (PP+8.9 to PP+9.2). Also something none of you have control over J.



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Debris observer. Community Liaison.

What location did you mostly report to?

JFO SME in Austin and Team leader in Houston.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

Non-RSC. EPA Region 6, Dallas

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

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Coordination with JFO SME contacts in Austin and team leader in Houston was excellent. There was constant communication with REOC contact in Dallas.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Although it was the nature of the task, I believe that frequent short notices and changes to the trip caused few last-minute changes in the airlines reservations and hotel reservations. And with that there was frequent change in planning with the State's observer.

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
As a result of these changes, there were change fees charged by the airlines.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
One of options may be have the trip booked with an extended time of return, and then change it only when person is finally ready to leave.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Alpha Branch Director

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 10 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? OSC Region 7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

A and B) The IAP helped with understanding each person's assignments and the contact information was useful when people needed information.

C) People at the IMT were flexible and would take documents by email and if email didn't work they would take the info on thumb drives or even a hard copy and then re-enter the information.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

A&B) The numbers of personnel coming and going from the incident was difficult to track. Some forgot to sign in at the ICP and others went directly into the field to do their work. While the IAP generally had good numbers of people the sit rep info, especially for the State organizations was difficult to track. Some of the people from the State of Texas were working from TCEQs office on Harvey related tasks and were difficult to account for.

C) There were several technical challenges with remote operation. Printers were not set up for everyone's computer so when operational or planning documents were needed for meetings there were delays in getting a hard copy for discussion. Additionally, the internet would go down and connection to the EPA network would be lost and several attempts were necessary to get

back in to use EPA mail system. Again this resulted in delays in information reception and dissemination.

C) I did spend about 4 days in Houston at the waste collection pad. I believe crews had been getting encouraged to collect orphan containers and once they were placed at the staging area they were segregated. Unfortunately, there were about 140 unknowns they were simply put into their one group and not screened for hazardous waste characteristics until the end of the response. Not only should these unknowns have been screened for waste characterization and determination of waste streams (speeding up the disposal process), they should have been screened so they could be segregated to insure incompatible materials were not stored in the same area.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

The numbers issue creates a situation where it appears there are more/less people participating in the response. As this goes up the management change it may call into question the effectiveness of the response or misperceptions of the cost.

Time was lost trying to reconnect to the EPA network several times through the day and work was repeated when hard copy info was retyped back into the system when electronic copies were not available.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Have a representative from each agency check the numbers for their personnel in the IAP and report it to the situation unit leader or other planning representative.

More robust internet. More technical assistance to get computers hooked up to printers.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Assist Kim Ngo with special requests

What location did you mostly report to? EPA Region 6 and on 8th floor

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 3 days for a total of 16.5 hours.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC: EPA Region 6 Drinking Water

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Unknown. Only worked on items as requested from supervisor. Never got to understand the full scope of things.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Logistics = Did not understand why water field staff were staying in Katy, Texas, when they were needed in the Webster, Conroe area. Training = We need better training of response manger and more hands on training when hurricane season starts. The one hour powepoint overview presentation does not work. b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects) Increased cost, delays and safety Unable to obtain reliable data with lack of response manger training What should be done to fix this problem? More training and assigning and OSC Mentor to new people interested in participating in response activities.

This was my first time on 8 during an emergency. Who are all those people there? Only knew 3

people down there.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Assist Kim Ngo with special requests

What location did you mostly report to? EPA Region 6 and on 8th floor

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 3 days for a total of 16.5 hours.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC: EPA Region 6 Drinking Water

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
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This was my first time on 8 during an emergency. Who are all those people there? Only knew 3

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What role did you mostly perform in the response? ENVL

What location did you mostly report to? R6 REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Day 1 (August 23 ish) until September 19 (yanked away to work on the San Jacinto ROD

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC/ R6 IMT member

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Overall, everything seemed to work pretty well. Having members from the NIMAT provided some good networking and different ways of thinking opportunities.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Communications, in general, did not seem to be as good as during past incidents. It's hard to put a finger on it, but communications between groups never really seemed as smooth as prior events. Perhaps, although beneficial in many ways, presence of the non-R6 NIMAT folks disrupted the 'normal' R6 flow/atmosphere we're used to. That flow never seemed to be gained even in their absence. The EU never really worked with the Planning Section. The EU was rather isolated (for better or worse). There were also a couple of incidences where data was being gathered without the EU knowing anything about it.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs,
delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Potentially all of the above plus moments of utter confusion.
-\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Good question. Communications are never going to be perfect, and it may just be an
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For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Deputy FSC

What location did you mostly report to? Dallas

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC – Region 4 Atlanta

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
2) What is an area of concern?
,
a) Short description of the problem
A separate logistics contract is needed from HQ to help support responders. Regions can't plan
adequately for their routine needs and an unknown event like a Hurricane. Lodging and supply
support are the two most critical needs

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Caused additional delays on beginning the response and giving responders assurance they would have a place to sleep and supplies to do their job correctly.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
HQ Office of Acquisition Management SRRPOD would be the best to address this.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to?

Reported to Bravo (Houston) but living guarters were in Charlie (Beaumont)

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
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- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

Plans

1) What worked well?

Plans: The Region 7 travel, REOC, and logistics staff were very helpful and responsive. I also easily got into the FOH for H and S.

Command/Control

Mitty Mohon (CL Team leader for Charlie) was great to take us under our wing since we were placed in Charlie even though we reported to Bravo. The trailers in Beaumont, Texas were very nice.

Process- Because we were remote, the daily calls with the CL team leaders provided some guidance to what we would be doing.

Many of the citizens we talked to thanked EPA for their work. Some said we were the first EPA person they had ever met and I think that the CLs in some way by being present helped with the public perception of the agency.

While I have some suggestions below, I don't want this to seem as though it was a negative experience. I sincerely enjoyed my deployment and have high respect for everyone involved. I know that not everything can run perfectly.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Plans – IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization

While I understand that this is a disaster response and there are a lot of unknowns, it would have been helpful to have received the CL packet well before we were deployed (at least 2 days). We didn't receive the community liaison packet until after we had arrived and it was over 90 pages. It was not something that was easy to review once we were on site.

Command/Control – Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics It varied between Disaster Response Centers and D-SNAP facilities on whether they would allow CLs to visit and share information for the attendees.

Process - Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow

When I left R7, I was told I would be staying in Houston for 2 weeks in a hotel. When I arrived, I found out that while I was staying in Bravo, that I would be moving 2 hours away to Beaumont, TX in a trailer. The trailer was fine but it was very far from our team leader in Houston. We only saw our team leader 1 time in person. Also, after we arrived we had been emailed the location and time to report at Bravo. When we arrived, the command post was shutting down and they had no idea that we were coming. They sent us 2 hours away to the command post in Port Arthur. We had no contact information for our team leader Sam Tates and we also just had an address for a mall. When we arrived to the mall, there was no command post. We had to go to the trailers in Beaumont and find another team leader, Mitty, to help us figure out where we were going. Often times, we had no idea who was coming to be a CL and how to manage those people coming in.

Overtime- When deployed, we were told that we would be working a large amount of overtime and we would be working 7 days per week. Due to funding I think, many of our overtime was cut by over 60% and we were asked to take at least 1 day off per week.

Level of Response – Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

I think that if the CLs had been deployed earlier, that there would have been an appropriate size sent. All of the CLs and leaders worked very hard but there were some comments including where we were the first 2 weeks of the disaster. In other words, we could have arrived sooner to these communities. As far as deliverables, we wrote daily reports. It is not known whether the people we reached out to were contacted to resolve their issue.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Plans – IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization

By not having the CL packet in advance, it did prevent us the first three days while we were there in accomplishing our mission. It took a lot of time to review it. Also, if I would have known the duties that I would be accomplishing I could have prepared more.

Command/Control – Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics It varied between Disaster Response Centers and D-SNAP facilities on whether they would allow CLs to visit and share information for the attendees. By not being included in town hall meetings and special event communications, we were not as effective as we could have been at larger events which would have given us more visibility. In order to solve this problem, the ICS leads could have had conversations more at the higher levels on the role EPA had with the disaster response and to encourage TEXAS, FEMA and other agencies to welcome us to their Town Hall meetings and other community outreach opportunities.

Process – Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow

By having 4 team members driving to over 4 locations to find a command post or someone to tell us our assignment there was a lot of time wasted. A lot of communication was being done through email and many of the team members had access to wifi or an EPA iphone. Because 4 Bravo team members were placed in trailers 2 hours away from the rest of the team, we really only received information on our phone calls. We also spent many long hours in the car up to 5 hours on some days just driving to our location of work.

Overtime- By not being able to work overtime, many of us missed valuable community town halls in the evenings and missed out on meeting with churches and others on Sundays.

Level of Response – Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

I think that if the CLs had been deployed earlier, that there would have been an appropriate size sent. I think the CLs could have had more impact on the communities if we would have been there right at the beginning. I also think that if the EOM or county commissioner asked a question, that the CL should have been notified if R6 followed up on the issue. If we ask about community needs, but we don't address them then it will impact our relationships with our partners.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Plans – IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization

For the CL packet, all staff that are known to potentially deploy as CLs could have had a quick conference call with the CL lead in order to better understand what our role is for the response before we deployed. We could have been made aware that while we would be handing out fliers that we would not have paper copies. We then would have maybe wanted to bring a thumb drive or another way to share information with the public. We also could have made researched online back in the regional office places we could email this information in advance rather than individually going to many places that did not have anyone there. We could have also printed out business cards with our names as well as the section lead who would be responsible for community correspondence after the CL's rotation is over. (In other words, some of the work of the CL could be done at their home office if we are using electronic means of communication). Meetings could also be set up beforehand with city councils, Mayors, etc.

Command/Control – Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics It varied between Disaster Response Centers and D-SNAP facilities on whether they would allow CLs to visit and share information for the attendees.

In order to solve this problem, the ICS leads could have had conversations more at the higher levels on the role EPA had with the disaster response and to encourage TEXAS, FEMA and other agencies to welcome us to their Town Hall meetings and other community outreach opportunities.

Process - Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow

By having 4 team members driving to over 4 locations to find a command post or someone to tell us our assignment there was a lot of time wasted. A lot of communication was being done through email and none of the team members had access to wifi or an EPA iphone. To fix this problem, either everyone deployed could have an EPA iphone or mifi, or the team leads need to call and give all of the instructions to each team member. Also, if a command post is shutting down, that needs to be communicated immediately to the team members traveling. In addition, while it was cheaper to keep staff in trailers, those staff were traveling up to 5 hours a day in some cases to their county sites.

Overtime- I am not sure who to solve the overtime issues. But, when some people were taking into consideration whether to deploy, the amount of overtime could be a factor. By decreasing the overtime by 60% it really impacted on our ability to make a significant difference in the community and did affect the morale of the team.

Level of Response – Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

When a high priority need is elevated in a daily report, the CL should be able to follow up with R6 to see if the problem has been addressed and possibly cc'd on the communication.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Drinking Water System Spot-checks and Emergency Landfill verifications.

What location did you mostly report to? ICP Coast Guard in Webster (Charlie)

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 11 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC R7 Water Division

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

I was on one of the first teams brought in from R7 and considering the timeline (I got there on 9/5/17). Considering the event and timeline I thought everything worked really well.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Communication between TECQ and EPA could have been better. The TECQ office was falling behind on relaying quality information to the teams in the field. Topographic (With info on elevation of areas investigated) maps also would have proved extremely helpful and made the process more efficient.
 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Wasted time and money. We were going to check on water systems that were well outside of the
flooded areas
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
More people helping TCEQ with manning phones and gathering data ahead of teams hitting the ground.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? ESF-10 rep at TX SEOC

What location did you mostly report to? SEOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 9 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? HQ staff

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

- A) mobilization and demobilization went smoothly. The IAP always arrived timely.
- B) The coordination with USCG seemed very smooth. I was very impressed.
- C) The FSC answered all my questions related to my TA, voucher, and pay cap waiver. Information flow seemed like it went well to me. No issues or concern.
- D) The SitReps had some grammatical issues at times but they arrived timely and contained relevant information for me to report to FEMA.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

I heard from the debris staging observers that they were unclear who they reported to at times and that some of them had bad experiences with TCEQ being rude to them. I hope this improved. I think they were frustrated because they felt like the EPA folks were stepping on their toes. I think we need to perhaps make sure TCEQ explains our mission to their staff so that the staff do not feel threatened when we are there to help.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
The TCEQ folks were rude to these EPA staff had made them spend hours waiting in the lobby of their office before going on the staging area observations refusing to let them participate in their planning. This was a waste of EPA staff time and also caused morale issues.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
I think when we worked out with TCEQ that we were going to perform this task that it should have been explained to TCEQ the role EPA was serving so that it was clear that EPA was there providing assistance rather than second guessing them.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Alpha – Corpus Cristi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 17 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC, Region 5, Chicago

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

I was able to quickly deploy.

Sending CL Co-Leads to the three areas (late in the game) was a good move to manage the areas hard hit by the hurricane.

Many of the CLs deployed early in the response were self-motivated and were able to organize the operation on the ground.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Some folks that were deployed did not have any ICS training.

Not enough Community Liaison (CL) personnel were deployed to the Alpha - Corpus Christi area which undermined the effectiveness of the CL personnel that were deployed to the area.

The original two CL folks deployed to Alpha, established a presence in FEMA DRCs that we were unable to staff due to the limited amount of staff in the area.

The leader of the Community Liaison folks in Dallas sent unclear direction to folks in the field and I did not feel listened to when concerns were raised.

There should have been more coordination between the ALPHA Command Post and the Community Liaison leader in Dallas, instead we were told not to give them information or coordinate with them in any way. The Liaison Officer in Alpha needed to know what CL folks were doing in her area in real time. I was not allowed to share written reports with her.

Written documentation should have been provided earlier in the response. Many folks in hard hit areas did not have internet access and were unable to obtain or print out the documentation.

Approval of the flyers should have happed earlier in the response.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

I think this prevented the accomplishment of the mission.

We were stretched pretty thin and worked more hours than we should have been working in order to accomplishment the mission – thus raising the costs.

We did not have paper documentation to provide to residents and/or county EOCs without printers or internet access.

This made EPA look bad and appear to be ineffective.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

The initial decision to have centralized control of CLs in Dallas was a bad decision. Should be part of IMT.

Better coordination between IMT and Community Liaison.

Should have had a CL leader in each area, rather than just one in Dallas. This was done later in the response and that solved much of the problem.

Pre approve fact sheets so when a disaster hits, they are ready to go.

Find a way to provided printed documentation early in the response.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Wharton County, Wharton

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 9/7 – 22/2017

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? RSC

Which Regional office/location? Region 6/ Dallas

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Health and Safety. Mobilization/De-mobilization Roles and Responsibilities Appropriate size

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

o site oor air
costs,
Also

An area of concern is coordination w/partners, (FEMA). FEMA providing information to residents with little or no knowledge of the information or problem. FEMA claims they have someone at

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Houston Lab

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 19 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? RSC Which Regional office/location? R6

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Assigning CLs to specific areas Daily update/status calls with Lead

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Lack of EJ component in the incident command structure

Not all CLs were sensitive to the needs/concerns of EJ communities

EOCs were not prepared and did not necessarily understand the need and purpose of the CLs.

Lack of printed materials (and lack of printed materials in needed languages) to disseminate in the impacted areas.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Lack of EJ component in ICS created a delay in reaching out to EJ areas;

Some CLs did not have a sensitivity/understanding of the unique needs of EJ communities and did not know how to outreach to those communities;

Some EOCs were reluctant to work with the CLs which slowed community outreach

Individuals and communities were not getting the information they needed to properly clean their property and protect themselves from contamination.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

To ensure that EJ issues are addressed in a timely manner an EJ staffing and support function should be established within the incident command structure. The position should be a part of the initial mobilization

Add EJ training components to required training for the Response Support Corps, ICS, etc.

Communicate the need to address EJ concerns to the EOCs

Provide printed copies of clean-up materials to impacted communities rather than computer links. Everyone does not have a way to electronically access materials.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 9/13 -

What role did you mostly perform in the response? $3 \ \mbox{\scriptsize ML}$

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

What location did you mostly report to? Rlo Reoc

	PSC ! NAST (10), RSC (2-)
EPEAT	QUESTIONS AS NEEDED
	nswering please take into consideration some of the following topics:
	Plans – IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
b) (Command/Control - Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
c) 1	Process – Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
d) I	Level of Response – Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables
1)	What worked well?
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	CINE OF COMMAND, EAST OF COMMUNICATION MANAGING UP BIC
111.0	M + PECINIA CASE OF CONTINUE WAS AST AC
	IC + REGIONAL MANAGEMENT ON-HAND INTERFACING THROUGHOUT
	THE OPS PERIOD. INFO FLOWS UP + DOWN WELL
	ROLES/RESPONSIBILLITES + COTTS WIN SECTIONS ME GOO
	SHAREPOINT & REHARVEY BOXES AND GREAT.
21	What is an area of concern?
=,	a) Short description of the problem
	SITREPS + INPUTS DIE NOT GOOD
	COORDINATION WI PORTNERS TO GET FIELD INFO
	NMAT MERDI IN REOC
	NI PESON

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

PELAYS REPORTING + MANAGING UP NHEN INCOMPLETE / POOR INGO STRUGGE IS REAL, OPPORTUNITES TO CERRON + BETTER POSITION FOR NEXT MISSION SHOULD NOT BE HO, PENING DURING tonué MISSIO

c) What should be done to fix this problem? POTRO-ACTIVE ANALYSIS NEEDED TO
PRINCIPE PRACTICAL EXERCISES USING WELL DEVELOPED EXAMPLES OF SIT REPS AND ALL ASSOC INPUTS TO QUIDE HEXT TRAINING EXERCISES: NAT'L & BEGIONAL, TEATLES PLANSEDION, SITPERS HAVE BEGUN TO HAVE GOOD CONTENT, SEEMS FIELD 075 DOESN'T PROVIDE GOOD DATA TO FIELD SITE WRITING PEPONE TOO MUCH E-MAIL TO REQUEST MORE INFO. EPA PHOTOS LOOK STAGED, PREDOMINANTRY, NOT THE EXCEPTS OF LETTUITTES es. TRAINING EXERCISES PS, SIW, COLI RESOURCE & OFS INTERPORTS PROVIDE READ - AHEADS TO TRAINS / EXERCE

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov

Please return completed form to R6HarveyHotwash@epa.gov or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

RSC(I +mnt) Ry-Dailos

What location did you mostly report to?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

vation of	al how realth	/ h		
work	was a westome	·, (Primanual R · START cont	.7) Into the respon vactors were a gr	so Team work ar eat help!
(II) - 1 - 1 - 1				
		problem		
			DC-1CS structurally	e was not in pla cid not flow. 100
menlah	on - info from	n the field w	vas not clear info	irmation was what
1	Vhat is an a) Short do ack of rany to	What is an area of concern? Short description of the pack of command (command) command (command) to the pack of t	Vhat is an area of concern? Short description of the problem ack of command/control in REG rang to mor training, information	

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
1-1	What should be done to fix this problem?
c)	What should be done to fix this problem:

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Please return completed form to <u>R6HarveyHotwash@epa.gov</u> or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

What location did you mostly report to? Corpus Christi

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? Z weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

1) What worked well?

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

The Unified Command of EPA, USCG, TCEQ & GLO
formed a very strong bond among ESF#10
response agencies. UC allied utilization
of the NDOW products & principles was very effective & effectiont 2) What is an area of concern?
Very effective à effeciant
a) Short description of the problem
Meeting the percieved expectations of
EPA upper management to make the
response activities larger than what
the actual situation required.
(NDOW was developed in part to ensure cost efficiency).
Cost efficiency).

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Increase Costs, out-supplying resources than what Logistics can handle. This can also result in unsafe working conditions.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Open discussions of the issues involved in this response and implementing reasonal corrections.

NDOW should implement some of these issues resolutions into their process (spee pictures, timely bullets, etc).

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

What location did you mostly report to?

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
If you want consisting between normal
response inches and character response, then your
OPS should actually home experience with the
remard action by Nie in 12 years does not provide enough experious to qualify as on OPS.
remaral action by Nie in 12 years does not
provide enough experient to qualify ich on OIS

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases cost delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
	delays of prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?

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Please return completed form to <u>R6HarveyHotwash@epa.gov</u> or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Environmental Unit
What location did you mostly report to? Dallas REOC
What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 23 days
Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? R6 RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1)	What worked well?
	Humor and positive attitude. IT support, 213 RR process, and computers.
2)	What is an area of concern? a) Short description of the problem (1) The Paragraph of the problem
	1) The Share Point software is difficult and hood to edit No body's fault, but operations would be smoother away from Share Point.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases cos delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
-	delays of prevents accomplishment of mission, other enests,
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>
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IMAT Team – procedures for ordering IMAT for response – who orders? Who pays for them? Also, communication between Regional IMT and National IMAT and integration was a lacking

"Top Heavy" Response – More EPA Staff and overall response personnel at the REOC than in the field. 24-hour ops for REOC staff when never needed for Operational Staff – also extended 24-hour ops for REOC long past was necessary

REOC sending staff and response resources to Field without notification and consent of IC, OPS, or Branch Directors. (Specifically CICs); CICs sent to field without notification to field staff or securing lodging and having little to no direction on tasks



What role did you mostly perform in the response?

Team Leader

What location did you mostly report to?

Bravo group south of Houston

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response?

15 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location?

OSC Region six

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

None	delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
с)	What should be done to fix this problem?
a.	

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or <u>Loesel.matthew@epa.gov</u>

Please return completed form to R6Harvey Hotwash@epa.gov or to the box in the REOC. would like to give verbal feedback you may call Matt Loesel at 202-578-2125 or Steve Materials and the second seco

The above said, I hope to see **EJ institutionalized regionally as part of ICS**. To better engrain EJ predictively, I suggest making it explicit as part of the Red, White, and Blue Teams make-up. There are different ways to do it - to illustrate, here is one way:

- Add Asst. EJ LNO as a uniquely distinct function part of RICT this function is in addition to the already described ASST. LNO, and would equally report to the Liaison Officer
 - <u>Train</u> the <u>Liaison Officer</u> to expressly and effectively <u>accept EJ responsibilities</u> as part of regular Liaison duties
- Identify and place EJ operable functions with a limited number of positions, such that staff can be pre-assigned and ready for field deployment at a moment's notice, maintaining ongoing full level of readiness (meeting all health, safety and other requirements)
 - <u>Train</u> the limited number of staff filling pre-assigned positions, sensitizing those staffs on EJ to operate effectively
- Work with OEJTIA to assist accomplishing the above suggestions, incorporating, printing and distributing the changes as appropriate
- Test the changes during the next exercise



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Group Supervisor – Water Infrastructure Assessment – Drinking Water 2

What location did you mostly report to? Coast Guard building in Webster, Texas

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 13 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Non-RSC Which Regional office/location? Region 6, Dallas, TX

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1)	What worked well?
2)	What is an area of concern?
	a) Short description of the problem

1.	Pre-install Response Manager to the Water Infrastructure Team	
	members' laptops weeks/days prior to deployment. Some laptop	S
	may require IT to issue administrator rights.	

- 2. Identify clear definitions and examples of Drinking Water and Wastewater codes that are in Response Manager. Possibly identify real-life situations.
- 3. Offer ability to provide real-time data. Response Manager is not accurate and many man-hours are needed to generate codes to manipulate to data to identify facilities that need follow-up. Quick fix is to generate codes to obtain accurate data for the next day.
- 4. Offer webinar/training for teams that may participate in Drinking Water and Wastewater assessments, including Region 6 staff, Region 7 (back-up to Region 6), Texas State Guard, etc.

b)	What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? SITL. Prepared SitReps, submitted daily photo logs, and uploaded photos to EPA Flickr account.

What location did you mostly report to? ICP

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 7 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC. R9, San Francisco

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

IAPs were readily available for each operational period. Staffing level of the ICP was appropriate. The mobilization process was efficient. Experienced responders answered questions and provided technical guidance. The duties of the SITL position was divided between EPA and the Coast Guard.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

Few 214s were submitted to the SITL. Information provided via 214-Bs were sometimes vague and lacked detail. Also, photo documentation of activities occurring in all three operational branches was inconsistent. A discussion of the PIO collecting and submitting photos instead of the SITL occurred but a determination of reassigning the task was not made. In addition, a lot of follow-up was required which proved to be challenging because field operations had completed by the time the information was submitted.

Also, the demobilization process was unclear. There was no formal check-out procedure.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

SitReps did not document/tell a complete story of the daily operations and accomplishments. Also, it caused delays in submitting the report by 9p. As a result, the deadline was moved to 10:30p. Feedback on the content of the SitReps was used to improve the quality of the reports.

Since the demobilization process was confusing, the number of personnel on site was often inaccurate. This number was included in the daily SitReps.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Activity Log (ICS 214) training or provide examples to field personnel. The content of the report depends on the information gathered and provided by the Ops Teams. QA/QC check of 214s for completeness and acceptability before submitting them to SITL. Have field observers available to assist SITL. Establish a clear demobilization/check-out procedure.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Finance

What location did you mostly report to? REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 1 week

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC, R6-Dallas

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Activating some KLPs to the IMT early to begin prep work. Having members of the NIMAT deployed to help.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

Knowing who was in the line of command at the beginning was confusing as well as knowing our expected daily report/end times. Assignments sometimes seemed duplicated and communication thereof lacking. Some positions had multiple staff members early on while others didn't. Even though KLPs may have attended the necessary trainings, it may work best to have an experienced member on-hand for "on the job training" for the first time in the hot seat. It is a very different beast going from book training to "real life". It was also confusing dealing with the HQ EOC. In training, we had steps/processes that we should follow and it became confusing and frustrating when the EOC became involved and the processes morphed very quickly.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Timeframes on deliverables grew (to almost unacceptable levels) because of waiting for the HQ EOC to decide the process, review drafts, and then follow-up. Regional staff didn't seem to understand that the process/delay was beyond local authority and as a result, faulted the REOC when in fact, it was out of our hands.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

Still not exactly sure how/when this changed and what role the HQ EOC has/should have in relation to the REOC. If they will be this involved in future responses, there needs to be people training/communication over how the relationship between the REOC and the EOC will work.

Also **highly** recommend having an experienced person as the primary person in the KLP offering hands-on training to a newbie before the newbie has to go it alone.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov

What role did you mostly perform in the response? Env Unit Leader's Deputy

What location did you mostly report to? Dallas, Corpus Christy

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 12 days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC, R5 IMT, N-IMAT: Region 5

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

- Great space in Dallas, ability to have internet and intranet, ability to display DITRA files and plums for ICs
- R6 support to N-IMAT and our roles was excellent
- Coordination from R6 Env. Unit was appropriate and correct

2) What is an area of concern?

- a) Short description of the problem
- Information flow from field situation/ situ updates (Arkema) was not timely at the beginning, but improved in a few days. Steady and time critical information flow channels establishment is very important and critical during IMAAC modeling in real life responses.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)

Could	result in delays of mission accomplishment or incomplete accomplishments
c)	What should be done to fix this problem?
	Env Unit scientists should be able to be incorporated into data/info flow channels (Regional coordinators and operational management get periodic or emergency updates and this info should be immediately shared with Env. Unit to take or recommend scientific or regulatory time critical countermeasures). Establishing a Countermeasure Coordinator's position within Env. Unit or directly under ICs but in tide communication with Env. Unit helps a lot (this recommendation is based on 5 national response experiences).

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Charlie Team – Beaumont-Port Arthur.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2 weeks.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Non-RSC Which Regional office/location? Region 7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Working in teams with an experienced field person on each team. While this may not have been planned or possible at all locations it did work out for us in the Beaumont-Port Arthur area.

2) What is an area of concern?

- a) Short description of the problem
- 1) Since nobody had previous experience as a community liaison we all had to work out our own plan to cover our assigned areas. Each team had a different way of completing the task which led to teams doing different activities. Some spent quite a bit of time planning locations to visit when in reality all of the locations planned did not need to be visited.
- 2) Timing of meetings and daily reports.
- 3) Lack of available WiFi at the RV sites.
- 4) Lack of available handouts until week 2.

- b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
- 1) By each team having a different way of completing the task we probably were not as efficient as we could have been.
- 2) Morning meets at 8:30AM kept teams from getting an early start to the day since some had many miles to drive to assigned areas. Daily reports due in the mid-afternoon meant teams had to stop work, formulate a report, and find a location with WiFi to send the report. It also meant that all work completed after the report was sent was reported a day later.
- 3) It was very difficult to get connected to the internet to send reports and update the Sharepoint forms. Some staff members had to use their personal cell phones as a hotspot to get connected.
- 4) Lack of available handouts kept staff from providing as good of information as possible. While many in the community have smart phones, most lost home computers due to flooding, and many of the elderly are not good with electronic communication.

c) What should be done to fix this problem?

- 1)The outreach effort should have been a layered pyramid type of approach. Start each county with the Emergency Management Coordinator and FEMA DRS locations, then cities including Mayor or City Administrator, Police, Fire, and EMS. Then to community relief organizations which included many churches. Finish by contacting churches/organizations that may or may not be providing relief services. If you start at the county, then city levels, these individuals will be able to direct you to the organizations providing relief services, saving teams quite a bit of time over just driving and finding them.
- 2)Morning meetings should begin by 7:30AM and last no more than 15 minutes. Afternoon reports should be due by COB or 5pm.
- 3) Make sure that WiFi service is available to all staff deployed, especially at RV sites. Either have regional provided hotspots or regional provided smartphones that could also be used as hotspots. Better communication between regions so incoming regions would also bring as many hotspots or smartphones as possible.
- 4) Now that brochures have been created and approved have the originals/templates ready to go and be printed as soon as the need next arises.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liaison

What location did you mostly report to? Alpha Command Post, Corpus Christi, TX

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 2-week deployment

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? RSC Which Regional office/location? R6/Dallas

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

I feel like working as a community liaison worked well. We served about 18 counties in the Corpus Christi area. It allowed EPA to have some "boots on the ground." We were able to see and hear the concerns of the community and relay those concerns up the chain of command. Passing out information is certain high traffic, high visibility and key areas such as: EOCs, DRCs, city planners, libraries, city halls, churches, volunteer camps and community feeding areas was a huge. It allowed us to reach out to many people.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

My concern is the timing of the Community Liaison activation. From my knowledge and talking with other government groups, municipalities and local groups, we probably should have deployed as soon as possible after the disaster. The first Community Liaisons did not get to Corpus Christi until well after 2 weeks post hurricane Harvey. We were giving out information for mold clean up, boil water, septic systems. The information we had to give could have been distributed much sooner. We could have been there shortly after the hurricane to help identify the needs of the community. By the time we arrived, mold had already taken over most homes. The information we provided could have helped people quicker in there time of need.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
The only effect it may have is on the logistics and financial team. Those teams would have to have the burden of finding lodging for the community liaison. Lodging may be hard to find after a disaster.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
To fix this problem I would recommend deploying Community Liaisons directly after a natural disaster.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov

Thoughts:

- Need cleared definition of role for CL's seen more as a PR thing rather than accomplishing something
- Need to have plan up front as to where to go and what to do
 - Targeting of specific groups/places
 - o How to get flyers versus copying them at Lab
 - What are the goals
- Make sure people going to field have mobilization/demobilization package to include:
 - o Where to report, who to report to and when
 - Some sort of Identification beyond ID Card lots of people out there, why would people believe we are from EPA – include contact information for people – who to call
 - o Timekeeping How do we handle OT and codes
 - o Phone/photo rules
 - o Check-in and Check-out
- Ensure team leads are prepared and are doing all they need
 - Messaging
 - o Timesheets
 - o Orientation/Safety Training
- Match skills to jobs Introverts do not make good CL's
- Good things
 - o TA/Travel issues great help from R6 Staff
 - o CL staff
 - § Flexible
 - § Enthusiastic
 - § Problem-solving
- Seem like this was a much more political response than before seemed very different



What role did you mostly perform in the response? REOC Management

What location did you mostly report to? Dallas

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 3 weeks

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? 7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Mobe and Demobe was smooth. Daily ops ran well despite added pressures. Individuals in ICS positions (e.g. chiefs and higher) were well-trained and knowledgeable. They accomplished much with relatively few resources.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

1-Senior Leaders appeared to not have a grasp or disregarded mission assignment processes. Much of the taskings were not related to the mission and drained key resources needed to accomplish mission-related tasks. Others in senior leadership positions did not have a grasp for leading teams.

2-Long-range staffing was being worked, but should start on day one (this happens on most incidents). Region 6 staff were exhausted too early and then were playing catch up with respect to rest, energy, and other normal job duties that don't go away.

3-plans staff need training soliciting, extracting, and distilling field information for the non-field/non-tech/political leader-type reader (sitreps and management reports). There was a lot of

wasted time and energy providing information that was not important to certain readers in the daily report.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
1,2-increases costs, time, energy, frustration. Decreases efficiency and effectiveness resulting in poorer service to the public. Creates low morale and can increase safety issues. 3-increases costs, time, energy, frustration.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
1-mission assignment training for senior leaders. Communications training for senior leaders, so they are better able to give clear objectives 2-bring in staff from outside the Region earlier, day one. Staff out the night shift earlier. 3-develop training for writing reports for politicals/public – include objectives of the types of reports, plain language writing, include strategies for collecting and organizing information, including so only updates are made instead of re-starting the process every day. Field staff need training on making information clear and meaningful – does not require follow up or deciphering to show that work is being done and achieving results.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? TAGA mobile laboratories coordinator - ambient air monitoring.

What location did you mostly report to?
Houston area but also reported in Corpus Christi and Port Neches/Port Arthur/Beaumont areas.

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 18 days on site.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Environmental Response Team – Chemist (TAGA Mobile Laboratories Coordinator) – Research Triangle Park, NC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

- Having an OSC on board help considerably with communications with Dallas and the
 other operational centers with the Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line
 of command, tactics.
- Houston Laboratory was a great asset security, power, infrastructure, etc. for the mobile laboratories and the personnel.
- Data flow was near real time, pertinent, and appropriate using the VIPER system as a means to push out the spatial and temporally coordinated air monitoring data and geographical positioning information.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

- ICS chain requests/directions were provided by members outside of the chain.
- Logistics (power for the TAGA mobile laboratories and appropriate lodging for the personnel) outside of the Houston area were not available when we were required to travel.
- Timing when moving to the new assignment areas, not much consideration was shown for the timing that is required to move the laboratory and personnel.
- Limited trained staff for the TAGA operations.
- b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
- Region 6 operations were not affected any issues were resolved internally by ERT.
- All tasks were successfully completed on schedule.

- c) What should be done to fix this problem?
- Better communication and planning of operations.
- Provide tasks and let the field team complete the assignment without too much direction of their operations by those distant to the work.
- Available power of the correct voltage and amperage at locations that will house the mobile laboratories away from Houston.
- Perhaps an opportunity to speak directly with the Region on the TAGA mobile laboratories capabilities and requirements so during future events the ICS will better understand what is provided and involved.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? Community Liason

What location did you mostly report to? Bravo

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? 16-days

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? Non-RSC Region 7

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?

Vehicles were provided. Responsibilities were clear and concise. Somewhat minimal health and safety risk.

- 2) What is an area of concern?
 - a) Short description of the problem

We were placed in Charlie trailers yet we were reporting to counties in Bravo. Driving was somewhat of a concern as we drove for hours each day.
b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
Increased costs lodging in Charlie trailers yet driving significant miles to report to Bravo. Work
codes were not provided in a timely manner thus leading to a significant delay in our overtime
pay.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
Region 6 should plan accordingly and get more organized.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response? PRL Admininstrator
What location did you mostly report to?

REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? Beginning to end.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
Having the PRL in Logistics with the lodging coordinator and deployment letter specialist works well.

2) What is an area of concern?

a) Short description of the problem

We need to include a travel specialist to the LOGS team. Not having a travel expert that can assist and answer questions of our travelers was a problem.

 b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases cost delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects) 	S,
It increases costs and causes delays. Having to change TA's can incur fees, and also delay travel.	
c) What should be done to fix this problem?	
Have a travel expert assigned to the LOGS branch in the REOC to assist people who are not frequent travelers, and can fix problems with TA's would be huge.	

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov



What role did you mostly perform in the response?
PRL Administrator
What location did you mostly report to?
REOC

What was the approximate length of time that you were involved in this response? Beginning to end.

Are you an OSC, RSC, or non-RSC? Which Regional office/location? RSC

REPEAT QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

When answering please take into consideration some of the following topics:

- a) Plans IAPs, Health and Safety, SOPs, Mobilization/De-mobilization
- b) Command/Control Roles/Responsibilities, Coordination w/ partners, line of command, tactics
- c) Process Communication, Documentation, Logistics, Finance, Information Flow
- d) Level of Response Appropriate size, Correct Personnel, Deliverables

1) What worked well?
Using PRL for tracking EPA employees.
2) What is an area of concern?
2) What is an area of concern?
a) Short description of the problem
The value of using PRL is diminished when we don't track contractors with it.

b) What effect does this problem have on EPA R6 operations? (For example: increases costs, delays or prevents accomplishment of mission, other effects)
The numbers in PRL are ineffective. We continually went back and forth with SITL on how many were where, until SITL stopped asking for PRL numbers. We need to use PRL as the tool for tracking all personnel under the EPA MA's.
c) What should be done to fix this problem?
If we add a START to the PRL admin team and have them spend each morning updating contractor locations and mob/demob status, it will enhance the ability of PRL to answer the "How many people in" question. I saw this work very well in the R2 Irma/Maria response.

For Questions, please contact Matt Loesel 202-578-2125 or Loesel.matthew@epa.gov